Last summer,
in the lull of the August media doze, the Bush Administration's
doctrine of preventive war took a major leap forward. On August
5, 2004, the White House created the Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization, headed by former US Ambassador
to Ukraine Carlos Pascual. Its mandate is to draw up elaborate
"post-conflict" plans for up to twenty-five countries that are
not, as of yet, in conflict. According to Pascual, it will also
be able to coordinate three full-scale reconstruction operations
in different countries "at the same time," each lasting "five
to seven years."
Fittingly,
a government devoted to perpetual pre-emptive deconstruction now
has a standing office of perpetual pre-emptive reconstruction.
Gone are
the days of waiting for wars to break out and then drawing up
ad hoc plans to pick up the pieces. In close cooperation with
the National Intelligence Council, Pascual's office keeps "high
risk" countries on a "watch list" and assembles rapid-response
teams ready to engage in prewar planning and to "mobilize and
deploy quickly" after a conflict has gone down.
Few
ideologues can resist the allure
of a blank slate - that was
colonialism's seductive promise:
"discovering" wide-open new lands
where utopia seemed possible...
There is, however, plenty of
destruction - countries smashed
to rubble, whether by so-called
Acts of God or by Acts of Bush
(on orders from God).
And where there is destruction
there is reconstruction,
a chance to grab hold of
"the terrible barrenness,"
as a UN official recently described
the devastation in Aceh,
and fill it with the most perfect,
beautiful plans.
The teams
are made up of private companies, nongovernmental organizations
and members of think tanks - some, Pascual told an audience at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies in October,
will have "pre-completed" contracts to rebuild countries that
are not yet broken. Doing this paperwork in advance could "cut
off three to six months in your response time."
The plans
Pascual's teams have been drawing up in his little-known office
in the State Department are about changing "the very social fabric
of a nation," he told CSIS. The office's mandate is not to rebuild
any old states, you see, but to create "democratic and market-oriented"
ones. So, for instance (and he was just pulling this example out
of his hat, no doubt), his fast-acting reconstructors might help
sell off "state-owned enterprises that created a nonviable economy."
Sometimes rebuilding, he explained, means "tearing apart the old."
"We
used to have vulgar colonialism.
Now we have sophisticated colonialism,
and they call it 'reconstruction'."
Few ideologues
can resist the allure of a blank slate - that was colonialism's
seductive promise: "discovering" wide-open new lands where utopia
seemed possible. But colonialism is dead, or so we are told; there
are no new places to discover, no terra nullius (there never was),
no more blank pages on which, as Mao once said, "the newest and
most beautiful words can be written."
There
is, however, plenty of destruction - countries smashed to rubble,
whether by so-called Acts of God or by Acts of Bush (on orders
from God). And where there is destruction there is reconstruction,
a chance to grab hold of "the terrible barrenness," as a UN official
recently described the devastation in Aceh, and fill it with the
most perfect, beautiful plans.
"We
used to have vulgar colonialism," says Shalmali Guttal, a Bangalore-based
researcher with Focus on the Global South. "Now we have sophisticated
colonialism, and they call it 'reconstruction'."
Foreign
consultants live high on
cost-plus expense accounts
and thousand-dollar-a-day salaries,
while locals are shut out of
much-needed jobs, training and
decision-making. Expert "democracy
builders" lecture governments on
the importance of transparency and
"good governance," yet most
contractors and NGOs refuse
to open their books to those
same governments.
It certainly
seems that ever-larger portions of the globe are under active
reconstruction: being rebuilt by a parallel government made up
of a familiar cast of for-profit consulting firms, engineering
companies, mega-NGOs, government and UN aid agencies and international
financial institutions. And from the people living in these reconstruction
sites - Iraq to Aceh, Afghanistan to Haiti - a similar chorus
of complaints can be heard.
The work is far too slow, if it is happening at all. Foreign
consultants live high on cost-plus expense accounts and thousand-dollar-a-day
salaries, while locals are shut out of much-needed jobs, training
and decision-making. Expert "democracy builders" lecture governments
on the importance of transparency and "good governance," yet most
contractors and NGOs refuse to open their books to those same
governments, let alone give them control over how their aid money
is spent.
Three months
after the tsunami hit Aceh, the New York Times ran a distressing
story reporting that "almost nothing seems to have been done to
begin repairs and rebuilding." The dispatch could easily have
come from Iraq, where, as the Los Angeles Times just reported,
all of Bechtel's allegedly rebuilt water plants have started to
break down, one more in an endless litany of reconstruction screw-ups.
It could also have come from Afghanistan, where President Hamid
Karzai recently blasted "corrupt, wasteful and unaccountable"
foreign contractors for "squandering the precious resources that
Afghanistan received in aid." Or from Sri Lanka, where 600,000
people who lost their homes in the tsunami are still languishing
in temporary camps.
If
anything, the stories of
corruption and incompetence
serve to mask this deeper scandal:
the rise of a predatory form of
disaster capitalism that uses the
desperation and fear created by
catastrophe to engage in radical
social and economic engineering.
And on this front, the reconstruction
industry works so quickly and
efficiently that the privatizations
and land grabs are usually
locked in before the local population
knows what hit them.
One hundred
days after the giant waves hit, Herman Kumara, head of the National
Fisheries Solidarity Movement in Negombo, Sri Lanka, sent out
a desperate e-mail to colleagues around the world. "The funds
received for the benefit of the victims are directed to the benefit
of the privileged few, not to the real victims," he wrote. "Our
voices are not heard and not allowed to be voiced."
But if the
reconstruction industry is stunningly inept at rebuilding, that
may be because rebuilding is not its primary
purpose. According to Guttal, "It's not reconstruction at all
- it's about reshaping everything."
If anything, the stories of corruption and incompetence serve
to mask this deeper scandal: the rise of a predatory form of disaster
capitalism that uses the desperation and fear created by catastrophe
to engage in radical social and economic engineering. And on this
front, the reconstruction industry works so quickly and efficiently
that the privatizations and land grabs are usually locked in before
the local population knows what hit them.
Kumara, in another e-mail, warns that Sri Lanka is now facing
"a second tsunami of corporate globalization and militarization,"
potentially
even more devastating than the first. "We see this as a plan of
action amidst the tsunami crisis to hand over the sea and the
coast to foreign corporations and tourism, with military assistance
from the US Marines."
Rapid
response to wars and natural
disasters has traditionally been the
domain of United Nations agencies,
which worked with NGOs to provide
emergency aid, build temporary
housing and the like. But now
reconstruction work has been
revealed as a tremendously
lucrative industry, too important
to be left to the do-gooders at the UN.
So today it is the World Bank,
already devoted to the principle of
poverty-alleviation through
profit-making, that leads the charge.
As Deputy
Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz designed and oversaw a strikingly
similar project in Iraq: The fires were still burning in Baghdad
when US occupation officials rewrote the investment laws and announced
that the country's state-owned companies would be privatized.
Some have pointed to this track record to argue that Wolfowitz
is unfit to lead the World Bank; in fact, nothing could have prepared
him better for his new job. In Iraq, Wolfowitz was just doing
what the World Bank is already doing in virtually every war-torn
and disaster-struck country in the world - albeit with fewer bureaucratic
niceties and more ideological bravado.
"Post-conflict"
countries now receive 20-25 percent of the World Bank's total
lending, up from 16 percent in 1998 - itself an 800 percent increase
since 1980, according to a Congressional Research Service study.
Rapid
response to wars and natural disasters has traditionally been
the domain of United Nations agencies, which worked with NGOs
to provide emergency aid, build temporary housing and the like.
But now reconstruction work has been revealed as a tremendously
lucrative industry, too important to be left to the do-gooders
at the UN. So today it is the World Bank, already devoted to the
principle of poverty-alleviation through profit-making, that leads
the charge.
And
there is no doubt that
there are profits to be made in the reconstruction business. There
are massive engineering and supplies contracts (US$10 billion
to Halliburton in Iraq and Afghanistan alone); "democracy building"
has exploded into a US$2 billion industry; and times have never
been better for public-sector consultants - the private firms
that advise governments on selling off their assets, often running
government services themselves as subcontractors. (Bearing Point,
the favored of these firms in the United States, reported that
the revenues for its "public services" division "had quadrupled
in just five years," and the profits are huge: US$342 million
in 2002 - a profit margin of 35 percent.)
But
shattered countries are attractive
to the World Bank for another reason:
They take orders well. After a
cataclysmic event, governments will
usually do whatever it takes to get
aid dollars - even if it means racking
up huge debts and agreeing to
sweeping policy reforms...
Apparently, this (can mean)
slashing public-sector jobs
(East Timor's government is half
the size it was under Indonesian
occupation) but lavishing aid money
on foreign consultants the bank
insists the government hire.
But
shattered countries are attractive to the World Bank for another
reason: They take orders well. After a cataclysmic event, governments
will usually do whatever it takes to get aid dollars - even if
it means racking up huge debts and agreeing to sweeping policy
reforms. And
with the local population struggling to find shelter and food,
political organizing against privatization can seem like an unimaginable
luxury.
Even better
from the bank's perspective, many war-ravaged countries are in
states of "limited sovereignty": They are considered too unstable
and unskilled to manage the aid money pouring
in, so it is often put in a trust fund managed by the World Bank.
This is the case in East Timor, where the bank doles out money
to the government as long as it shows it is spending responsibly.
Apparently,
this means slashing public-sector jobs (East Timor's government
is half the size it was under Indonesian occupation) but lavishing
aid money on foreign consultants the bank insists the government
hire (researcher Ben Moxham writes, "In one government department,
a single international consultant earns in one month the same
as his twenty Timorese colleagues earn together in an entire year").
In Afghanistan,
where the World Bank also administers the country's aid through
a trust fund, it has already managed to privatize healthcare by
refusing to give funds to the Ministry of Health to build hospitals.
Instead it funnels money directly to NGOs, which are running their
own private health clinics on three-year contracts. It has also
mandated "an increased role for the private sector" in the water
system, telecommunications, oil, gas and mining and directed the
government to "withdraw" from the electricity sector and leave
it to "foreign private investors."
These profound transformations of Afghan society were never debated
or reported on, because few outside the bank know they took place:
The changes were buried deep in a "technical annex" attached to
a grant providing "emergency" aid to Afghanistan's war-torn infrastructure
- two years before the country had an elected government.
Many
observers say that today's
disaster capitalism really hit its stride
with Hurricane Mitch.
For a week in October 1998,
Mitch parked itself over
Central America, swallowing villages
whole and killing more than 9,000.
Already impoverished countries were
desperate for reconstruction aid -
and it came, but with strings attached.
It has been
much the same story in Haiti, following the ouster of President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In exchange for a US$61 million loan,
the bank is requiring "public-private partnership and governance
in the education and health sectors," according to bank documents
- i.e., private companies running schools and hospitals. Roger
Noriega, US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs, has made it clear that the Bush Administration shares
these goals. "We will also encourage the government of Haiti to
move forward, at the appropriate time, with restructuring and
privatization of some public sector enterprises," he told the
American Enterprise Institute on April 14, 2004.
These are
extraordinarily controversial plans in a country with a powerful
socialist base, and the bank admits that this is precisely why
it is pushing them now, with Haiti under what approaches military
rule. "The Transitional Government provide[s] a window of opportunity
for implementing economic governance reforms... that may be hard
for a future government to undo," the bank notes in its Economic
Governance Reform Operation Project agreement.
For Haitians, this is a particularly bitter irony: Many blame
multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, for deepening
the political crisis that led to Aristide's ouster by withholding
hundreds of millions in promised loans. At the time, the Inter-American
Development Bank, under pressure from the State Department, claimed
Haiti was insufficiently democratic to receive the money, pointing
to minor irregularities in a legislative election. But now that
Aristide is out, the World Bank is openly celebrating the perks
of operating in a democracy-free zone.
The World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund
have been imposing shock therapy on countries in various states
of shock for at least three decades, most notably after Latin
America's military coups and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Yet
many observers say that today's disaster capitalism really hit
its stride with Hurricane Mitch. For a week in October 1998, Mitch
parked itself over Central America, swallowing villages whole
and killing more than 9,000. Already impoverished countries were
desperate for reconstruction aid - and it came, but with strings
attached. In the two months after Mitch struck, with the country
still knee-deep in rubble, corpses and mud, the
Honduran congress initiated what the Financial Times called "speed
sell-offs after the storm."
Now
the bank is using the
December 26 tsunami to push
through its cookie-cutter policies.
The most devastated countries have
seen almost no debt relief,
and most of the World Bank's
emergency aid has come
in the form of loans, not grants.
Rather than emphasizing the need to
help the small fishing communities -
more than 80 percent of the wave's
victims - the bank is pushing for
expansion of the tourism sector
and industrial fish farms.
It passed
laws allowing the privatization of airports, seaports and highways
and fast-tracked plans to privatize the state telephone company,
the national electric company and parts of the water sector. It
overturned land-reform laws and made it easier for foreigners
to buy and sell property. It was much the same in neighboring
countries: In the same two months, Guatemala announced plans to
sell off its phone system, and Nicaragua did likewise, along with
its electric company and its petroleum sector.
All of the
privatization plans were pushed aggressively by the usual suspects.
According to the Wall Street Journal, "the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund had thrown their weight behind the [telecom] sale,
making it a condition for release of roughly US$47 million in
aid annually over three years and linking it to about US$4.4 billion
in foreign-debt relief for Nicaragua."
Now
the bank is using the December 26 tsunami to push through its
cookie-cutter policies. The most devastated countries have seen
almost no debt relief, and most of the World Bank's emergency
aid has come in the form of loans, not grants. Rather than emphasizing
the need to help the small fishing communities - more than 80
percent of the wave's victims - the bank is pushing for expansion
of the tourism sector and industrial fish farms.
As for the damaged public infrastructure, like roads and schools,
bank documents recognize that rebuilding them "may strain public
finances" and suggest that governments consider privatization
(yes, they have only one idea). "For certain investments,"
notes the bank's tsunami-response plan, "it may be appropriate
to utilize private financing."
Hundreds
of thousands of people
are being forcibly relocated inland,
to military style barracks in Aceh
and prefab concrete boxes
in Thailand. The coast is not being
rebuilt as it was - dotted with
fishing villages and beaches strewn
with handmade nets. Instead,
governments, corporations and
foreign donors are teaming up
to rebuild it as they would like it
to be: the beaches as playgrounds
for tourists, the oceans as watery
mines for corporate fishing fleets,
both serviced by privatized airports
and highways built on
borrowed money.
As in other
reconstruction sites, from Haiti to Iraq, tsunami relief has little
to do with recovering what was lost. Although hotels and industry
have already started reconstructing on the coast, in Sri Lanka,
Thailand, Indonesia and India, governments have passed laws preventing
families from rebuilding their oceanfront homes. Hundreds
of thousands of people are being forcibly relocated inland, to
military style barracks in Aceh and prefab concrete boxes in Thailand.
The coast is not being rebuilt as it was - dotted with fishing
villages and beaches strewn with handmade nets. Instead, governments,
corporations and foreign donors are teaming up to rebuild it as
they would like it to be: the beaches as playgrounds for tourists,
the oceans as watery mines for corporate fishing fleets, both
serviced by privatized airports and highways built on borrowed
money.
In January
Condoleezza Rice sparked a small controversy by describing the
tsunami as "a wonderful opportunity" that "has paid great dividends
for us." Many were horrified at the idea of treating a massive
human tragedy as a chance to seek advantage. But, if anything,
Rice was understating the case. A group calling itself Thailand
Tsunami Survivors and Supporters says that for "businessmen-politicians,
the tsunami was the answer to their prayers, since it literally
wiped these coastal areas clean of the communities which had previously
stood in the way of their plans for resorts, hotels, casinos and
shrimp farms. To them, all these coastal areas are now open land!"
Disaster,
it seems, is the new terra nullius.
Note:
The above essay is used with permission.
Naomi Klein is the author of "No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand
Bullies" and "Fences and Windows: Dispatches From the Front Lines
of the Globalization Debate."
Click here for her
article, The Mother Of All Anti-War Forces.